BEFORE THE POLLUTION CONTROL HEARINGS BOARD OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

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Appellant,) PCHB No. 87-163

) FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT,
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
ON) AND ORDER

PUGET SOUND AIR POLLUTION CONTROL AGENCY,

DEV/MAR CORPORATION.

Respondent.

This matter, the appeal of a notice and order of civil penalty (No. 6687), assessing \$1000 for alleged violations of Article 8 of Regulation I of the Puget Sound Air Pollution Control Agency (PSAPCA), came on for hearing on March 31, 1989, in Everett, Washington, before the Pollution Control Hearings Board; Wick Dufford, presiding, and Harold S. Zimmerman.

Robert Jungaro, owner, represented Dev/Mar. Keith D. McGoffin, attorney at law, represented PSAPCA. The proceedings were reported by Pamela Moughton of Bartholomew & Associates. Witnesses were sworn and testified. Exhibits were admitted and examined. From the testimony heard and exhibits examined, the Board makes the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT

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Dev/Mar is a construction and development company located in Mukilteo, Washington.

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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER PCHB No. 78-163

FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT,

PSAPCA is a municipal corporation with authority to conduct a program of air pollution prevention and control in a multi-county area which includes the City of Everett, site of the burning in question.

The Board takes notice of PSAPCA's Regulation I, including Article 8, which deals with causing or allowing outdoor fires.

III

On January 16, 1987, PSPACA issued a Population Density Vertification for land clearing burning to Dev/Mar, confirming that the population within 0.6 miles of the proposed burning site (8605 18th Avenue West, Everett, Washington) is 2500 persons per square mile or less. At the time, Article 8 allowed land clearing burning to be conducted in such relatively sparsely populated areas. Former Section 8.06.

"Land clearing burning" was defined in Section 1.07(y) as follows:

Land clearing burning" means outdoor fires consisting of residue of a natural character such as trees, stumps, shrubbery or other natural vegetation arising from land clearing projects and burned on the lands on which the material originated.

The Population Density Verification contained the following written warning:

> The outdoor fires must not contain-any material other than trees, stumps, shrubbery or other natural vegetation which grew on the property being cleared.

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FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER PCHB No. 78-163

On January 29, 1987, the City of Everett Fire Department issued a permit to Robert Jungaro, owner, for Dev/Mar to conduct "controlled outdoor burning for the purpose of land clearing" at 8605 18th Avenue West, Everett, Washington.

Attached to the permit was a notice which advised that the site had been inspected and a large pile of debris and refuse had been observed, including boards, shingles, composition roofing materials, plastic tarps, pails, metal objects, discarded plastic toys and discarded tires.

The notice stated that none of these items were to be burned and that the permit was only for burning natural vegetation which grew on the property to be cleared.

V

On March 12, 1987, in the early evening, fire inspector Warren Eurns arrived at 8605 18th Avenue West to inspect a fire being burned under the Everett Fire Department's permit. He found the fire burning unattended, without a fire watch, containing (in addition to natural vegetation) a rubber tire, concrete blocks, plastic buckets, places of sheet metal.

About 30 minutes after the inspector arrived, Robert Becker, Dev/Mar's subcontractor for clearing and burning, appeared and commenced to extinguish the fire with a bulldozer at the fire inspector's request.

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FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT,

The Everett Fire Department advised PSAPCA of its inspection and observations. On March 20, 1987, PSAPCA issued two notices of violation jointly to Dev/Mar and to Robert Becker for burning on March 12, 1987. Notice No. 021909 asserted a violation of Regulation I, Section 8.05(1) and described the violation as "an outdoor fire other than land clearing or residential burning without prior written approval" of PSAPCA. Notice No. 021910 asserted a violation of Regulation I, Section 8.02(3) and described the violation as "an outdoor fire containing prohibited materials such as tires and plastic."

Subsequently, on May 29, 1987, FSAPCA issued to Dev/Mar and to Becker a Notice and Order of Civil Penalty (No. 6687) which assessed an aggregate fine of \$1000 for the two violations asserted in the notices of violation referring to March 12, 1987.

On June 2, 1987, Robert Jungaro, for Dev/Mar, filed with this Board a notice of appeal, relating explicitly to Notices of Violation Nos. 021909 and 021910. We find that it was his intention, by this action, to appeal the civil penalty relating to these violation notices.

VII --

PSAPCA issued to Dev/Mar another notice of violation and another civil penalty notice for \$1000 asserting the burning of prohibited

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material at the same site on April 15, 1987. The Board's files disclose no record of any notice of appeal referring to these documents and this incident.

VIII

Prior to the Dev/Mar project, a considerable amount of non-vegetative debris and garbage had been dumped on the burning site by members of the public. On March 10 and 11, 1987, Jungaro had over 100 cubic yards of this material hauled away to an authorized disposal site.

There is no evidence that Jungaro or Becker themselves brought any material in from off-site to be burned.

IX

The burning had been in progress for at least three days before the inspection on March 12th, during which time a fire watch had been on hand. There is no evidence that this watchman observed any debris being brought into the site and placed in the fire by strangers.

The fire watch was absent briefly on the 12th and was not present when Inspector Burns arrived. We are not convinced, however, that the non-vegetative debris found in the fire by the inspector was imported by strangers and placed in the fire during this short hiatus.

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PSAPCA attempted to introduce into evidence the affidavit of its own inspector, dealing with a follow-up visit to the site after the

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report of Inspector Burns inspection was received. The PSAPCA inspector was not present at hearing, having moved to California.

Upon objection, his affidavit was excluded. The Board's Findings concerning the March 12, 1987 fire and the condition of the site are derived solely from the testimony of the Everett Fire Department's Inspector Burns.

XΙ

PSAPCA's enforcement chief testified as to prior proceedings involving Mr. Jungaro.

Jungaro was held to have violated land clearing burning requirements and to have burn prohibited material in a prior incident occurring some 10 years earlier. Jungaro v. PSAPCA, PCHE No. 77-168 (1978). In the present case, his actions in obtaining permits and in having non-vegetative debris hauled away from the site evidence a knowledge of the applicable regulations restricting burning.

IIX

We find Becker acted as Dev/Mar's agent. We find that Dev/Mar caused or allowed the outdoor fire containing the materials observed by Inspector Burns on March 12, 1987.

IIIX

We find that the fire consisted primarily of natural residue from land clearing of the site. Although some attempt was made to

rid the site of other debris, the effort was incomplete, and a certain amount of pre-existing non-vegetative debris was also burned. However, we are persuaded that the burning of such debris was incidental to the principal aim of the burning which was to dispose of land clearing wastes generated on site.

FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER PCHB No. 78-163 VIX

Any Conclusion of Law which is deemed a Finding of Fact is hereby adopted as such.

From these Findings of Fct, the Board comes to these CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

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The Board has jurisdiction over these persons and these matters. Chapters 43.21B and 70.94 RCW.

ΙI

This case has a rather lengthy procedural history of postponements and rescheduling. The Board was obliged to reschedule the matter after the initial hearing date, December 14, 1987. Then, though all parties were present and ready to proceed, other matters took the available hearing time. After several reschedulings, the matter was set for September 13, 1988. On that date, Dev/Mar failed to appear and an Order of Dismissal was entered. Subsequently Jungaro asked that the matter be re-opened on the grounds he had

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received no notice of the September 13 hearing. Thereafter, an Order Granting Motion to Reconsider was entered (November 2, 1988), the Order of Dismissal was, in effect, vacated and the matter was rescheduled for hearing. Following one more continuance, the hearing was actually conducted on March 31, 1989.

The absence of PSAPCA's own inspector at hearing doubtless owes something to the extraordinary delay. Nonetheless, his affidavit was excluded on the grounds of its hearsay nature and the inability of appellant to cross examine. That ruling is hereby affirmed.

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RCW 70.94.740 states, in pertinent part:

It is the policy of the state to achieve and maintain high levels of air quality and to this end to minimize to the greatest extent reasonably possible the burning of outdoor fires. Consistent with this policy, the legislature declares that such fires should be allowed only on a limited basis under strict regulation and close control.

RCW 70.94.775 states in pertinent part:

No person shall cause or allow any outdoor fire:

 containing garbage, dead animals. asphalt, petroleum products, paints, rubber products, plastics, or any substance other than natural vegetation which emits dense smoke or obnoxious odors...

At the time of the event in question, Section 8.02 of PSAPCA Regulation I, stated in pertinent part:

> It shall be unlawful for any person to cause or allow any outdoor fire: . . .

FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

(3) containing garbarge, dead animals, 1 asphalt, petroleum products, paints, rubber products, plastics, or any substance other than 2 natural vegetation which emits dense smoke or obnoxious odors 3 Section 8.05 of Regulation I stated in pertinent part: 4 It shall be unlawful for any person to cause 5 or allow any outdoor fire other than land clearing burning or residential burning except under the 6 following conditions: 7 Prior written approval has been issued by the Control Officer or Board ... 8 Appellant's burning is alleged to have violated both of these 9 regulatory sections. 10 v 11 We conclude that the fire burned on May 12, 1987, violated 12 Regulation I, Section 8.02(3)(and RCW 70.94.775) because it contained 13 prohibited materials. We further conclude that Dev/Mar is legally 14 responsible. 15 VI 16 However, we conclude that no independent violation of Section 17 8.05(1) was shown. 18 VII 19 Section 8.05(1) refers to burning which is neither land clearing 20 burning non residential burning. Residential burning is not involved 21 here. So, the apparent basis for alleging this violation is the 22 theory that any fire which contains material other than natural 23 vegetation generated on site is outside the definition of land 24 25 26 FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER

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PCHB No. 78-163

clearing burning. Section 1.07(y)(quoted in Finding III above).

We do not agree that the mere presence of prohibited materials in what is primarily a land clearing fire gives rise to a separate offense for failure to get a non-land-clearing burn permit. Such a permit, if sought, would be unobtainable because burning prohibited material cannot be allowed.

Thus, the permit requirement in this context is just another way of saying. "Thou shalt not burn prohibited materials." Appellant is being charged with two violations for the same thing.

The State Clean Air Act states that each violation is "a separate and distinct offense." RCW 70.94.431. Implicit in this formulation is, we believe, the intention that each separate and distinct violation requires different acts or consequences on the part of the violator. See Sher-Wood Products, Inc. v. PSAPCA, PCHB No. 85-13 (1985).

If appellant had hauled material in from another site to burn, the definition of land clearing burning would have been violated and a permit would have been required. Such action would constitute a separate substantive offense. See Lloyd Enterprises v. PSAPCA, PCHB 85-155 (1985).

Moreover, if the burning in question were shown to involve non-vegetative materials to such an extent that the burning of these materials could be said to be more than incidental to what is primarily a land clearing fire, then a separate and distinct

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violation would be made out. But, the record does not so persuade us in this case.

VII

The \$1000 penalty in this case is based on two asserted violations. Having concluded that only one of these violations should be sustained, we turn to whether the amount of penalty is appropriate.

Analysis of this issue involves a consideration of factors bearing on reasonableness, including:

- (a) the nature of the violation;
- (b) the prior behavior of the violator;
- (c) actions taken after the violation to solve the problem. Puget Chemco, Inc. v. PSAPCA, PCHB No. 84-245 (1985).

On the record before us, the violation appears to have been the result of a lack of thoroughness in segregating materials from the burn piles in circumstances where the violator knew or should have known what could and couldn't be burned. However, serious air pollution consequences were not shown.

Jungaro personally (not Dev/Mar) was shown to have violated land clearing burning and prohibited materials regulations 10 years earlier, but that event, remote in time, does not constitute a prior pattern of corporate violations.

A notice of violation and penalty were issued to Dev/Mar for burning prohibited materials a month later at the same site.

FINAL FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER PCHB No. 78-163

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However, under the circumstances, we are unwilling to accept these bare citations as proving the facts they assert, and have not considered them as establishing appellant's post-offense behavior. We do note, however, that Dev/Mar's employees readily complied with the instructions given at the site by Inspector Burns.

VIII

Dev/Mar argues that its appeal includes the notice of violation and civil penalty relating to April 15, 1987. As noted in our Finding VII, we disagree. The appellants pleadings make no reference to either of these documents.

Accordingly, we hold that no appeal of the asserted violation and penalty relating to April 15, 1987, is or has been before us. RCW 43.218.300(2) provides a 30 day appeal period after a civil penalty is received by the person penalized. The time to appeal these later citations had long since passed by the time this matter came to hearing.

IX

Under all the facts and circumstances, we believe that the maximum allowable penalty is unwarranted for the single violation of burning prohibited materials on the date in question (March 12, 1987). The following Order is, we decide, appropriate.

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Any Finding of Fact which is deemed a Conclusion of Law is hereby adopted as such.

1	ORDER
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3	The violation of Section 8.05(1) of Regulation I is reversed.
4	The violation of Section 8.02(3) of Regulation I is affirmed.
5	The penalty is abated to \$500 and affirmed in that amount.
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7	DONE this 14th day of Stone, 1989.
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